From 51927da8b23b77fa3f886b9c88a668a88e3ac02a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Hammill Date: Sat, 4 Dec 2010 00:17:28 +0100 Subject: Manually download the Simon Wilkinson kext patch. This should really be done in the ebuild, like the other patches. For now, check the Web site: http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html for version match, then download into files: wget -c http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patch --- .../files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patch | 2975 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 2975 insertions(+) create mode 100644 net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patch diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ccc089 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2975 @@ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/gss-serv.c 2008-05-19 06:05:07.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@ + #include "channels.h" + #include "session.h" + #include "misc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "uidswap.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = +- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; ++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + + #ifdef KRB5 + extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; +@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ + char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + gss_OID_set oidset; + +- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (-1); ++ } + +- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (-1); +- } ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, ++ NULL, NULL))) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + +- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); ++ } else { ++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + } +- +- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, +- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) +- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +- +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (ctx->major); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + /* Privileged */ +@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ + } + + /* Unprivileged */ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { ++ gss_OID_set supported; ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); ++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, ++ NULL, NULL)); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, ++ const char *dummy) { ++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; ++ int res; ++ ++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); ++ ++ return (res); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ + void + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + { +@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ + gss_OID_set supported; + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) ++ return; + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, +@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@ + ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + { + int i = 0; ++ int equal = 0; ++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { ++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || ++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, ++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, ++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, ++ new_name, &equal); + +- gss_buffer_desc ename; ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if (!equal) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); ++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); ++ client->name = new_name; ++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ client->updated = 1; ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } + + client->mech = NULL; + +@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@ + if (client->mech == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + ++ if (ctx->client_creds && ++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &client->displayname, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@ + return (ctx->major); + } + ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; +@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@ + + /* Privileged */ + int +-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; + +@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@ + return 0; + } + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) +- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) ++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { ++ gssapi_client.used = 1; ++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; + return 1; +- else { ++ } else { + /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); +@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@ + return (0); + } + +-/* Privileged */ +-OM_uint32 +-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running ++ * as the user, the monitor is root. ++ * ++ * In the child, we want to : ++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify ++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update ++ */ ++ ++/* Stuff for PAM */ ++ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, ++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) + { +- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, +- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); ++} ++#endif + +- return (ctx->major); ++void ++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { ++ int ok; ++ int ret; ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; ++ char *envstr; ++#endif ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); ++ ++ if (!ok) ++ return; ++ ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); ++ ++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will ++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options ++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) ++ */ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ if (!use_privsep) { ++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, ++ &pamconv, &pamh); ++ if (ret) ++ return; ++ ++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, ++ gssapi_client.store.envval); ++ ++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); ++ if (!ret) ++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); ++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); ++#endif ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { ++ int ok = 0; ++ ++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ ++ if (!gssapi_client.updated) ++ return 0; ++ ++ gssapi_client.updated = 0; ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); ++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) ++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); ++ else ++ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); ++ ++ restore_uid(); ++ ++ return ok; + } + + #endif +Index: openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/servconf.c 2009-06-21 11:26:17.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; ++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +@@ -210,8 +213,14 @@ + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) + options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; ++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; ++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -302,7 +311,9 @@ + sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, + sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2, +- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, ++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, ++ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, + sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, +@@ -364,9 +375,15 @@ + #ifdef GSSAPI + { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, +@@ -891,10 +908,22 @@ + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sGssCleanupCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssStrictAcceptor: ++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sGssStoreRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +Index: openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/servconf.h 2009-01-28 05:31:23.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ ++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ ++ int gss_store_rekey; + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/sshd_config 2008-07-02 13:35:43.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config 2010-01-24 10:30:18.000000000 +0000 +@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ + # GSSAPI options + #GSSAPIAuthentication no + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes ++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +Index: openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5 +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/sshd_config.5 2009-08-28 01:27:08.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -379,12 +379,40 @@ + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange ++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. + .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials + Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache + on logout. + The default is + .Dq yes . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck ++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor ++a client authenticates against. If ++.Dq yes ++then the client must authenticate against the ++.Pa host ++service on the current hostname. If ++.Dq no ++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the ++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation ++on multi homed machines. ++The default is ++.Dq yes . ++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, ++and setting it to ++.Dq no ++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey ++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a ++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed ++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is ++.Dq no . + .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication + Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together + with successful public key client host authentication is allowed +Index: openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/readconf.c 2010-01-24 10:28:05.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts, + oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, +@@ -164,10 +165,18 @@ + { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, + #endif + { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, + { "usersh", oDeprecated }, +@@ -454,10 +463,26 @@ + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oGssDelegateCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssClientIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssRenewalRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1013,7 +1038,11 @@ + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -1105,8 +1134,14 @@ + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; ++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +Index: openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/readconf.h 2010-01-24 10:28:05.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@ + int challenge_response_authentication; + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ ++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ ++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config.5 +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/ssh_config.5 2010-01-24 10:28:05.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config.5 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -478,11 +478,38 @@ + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using ++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default ++identity will be used. + .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Dq no . +-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++If set to ++.Dq yes ++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the ++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed ++credentials to a session on the server. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +Index: openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/sshconnect2.c 2010-01-24 10:28:05.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2010-01-24 10:35:28.000000000 +0000 +@@ -105,9 +105,34 @@ + { + Kex *kex; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++#endif ++ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = host; ++ ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { + logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); + options.ciphers = NULL; +@@ -135,6 +160,17 @@ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + options.hostkeyalgorithms; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the ++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ ++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], ++ "%s,null", orig); ++ xfree(gss); ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.rekey_limit) + packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit); + +@@ -144,10 +180,26 @@ + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ } ++#endif + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; ++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; ++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; ++ kex->gss_host = gss_host; ++ } ++#endif ++ + xxx_kex = kex; + + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); +@@ -236,6 +288,7 @@ + void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); ++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); + #endif + + void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); +@@ -251,6 +304,11 @@ + + Authmethod authmethods[] = { + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ {"gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ NULL, ++ &options.gss_authentication, ++ NULL}, + {"gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + NULL, +@@ -542,19 +600,29 @@ + static u_int mech = 0; + OM_uint32 min; + int ok = 0; ++ const char *gss_host; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ + + if (gss_supported == NULL) +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { ++ gss_supported = NULL; ++ return 0; ++ } + + /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && + ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { ++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, ++ options.gss_client_identity)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + mech++; +@@ -651,8 +719,8 @@ + { + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; +- int oidlen; +- char *oidv; ++ u_int oidlen; ++ u_char *oidv; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); +@@ -762,6 +830,48 @@ + xfree(msg); + xfree(lang); + } ++ ++int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ms; ++ ++ static int attempt = 0; ++ if (attempt++ >= 1) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { ++ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); ++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); ++ ++ return (1); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + int +Index: openssh-5.3p1/auth.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/auth.h 2008-11-05 05:20:46.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/auth.h 2010-01-24 10:28:35.000000000 +0000 +@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ + int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ + int attempt; + int failures; ++ int server_caused_failure; + int force_pwchange; + char *user; /* username sent by the client */ + char *service; +Index: openssh-5.3p1/auth2-gss.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/auth2-gss.c 2007-12-02 11:59:45.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/auth2-gss.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ + static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); + static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); + ++/* ++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. ++ */ ++static int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ int authenticated = 0; ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); ++ mic.length = len; ++ ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, ++ &gssbuf, &mic)))) ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ xfree(mic.value); ++ ++ return (authenticated); ++} ++ + /* + * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know + * how to check local user kuserok and the like) +@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@ + + if (!present) { + xfree(doid); ++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; + return (0); + } + +@@ -109,6 +144,7 @@ + if (ctxt != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + xfree(doid); ++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; + return (0); + } + +@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@ + + packet_check_eom(); + +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +@@ -277,7 +314,8 @@ + gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = ++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); + else + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + +@@ -292,6 +330,12 @@ + userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic"); + } + ++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { ++ "gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ &options.gss_authentication ++}; ++ + Authmethod method_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, +Index: openssh-5.3p1/auth2.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/auth2.c 2009-06-22 07:11:07.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/auth2.c 2010-01-24 10:30:18.000000000 +0000 +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ + extern Authmethod method_kbdint; + extern Authmethod method_hostbased; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE +@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &method_gsskeyex, + &method_gssapi, + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE +@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@ + #endif + + authctxt->postponed = 0; ++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0; + + /* try to authenticate user */ + m = authmethod_lookup(method); +@@ -346,7 +349,8 @@ + } else { + + /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ +- if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0) ++ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure && ++ (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) + authctxt->failures++; + if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +Index: openssh-5.3p1/auth-krb5.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/auth-krb5.c 2006-08-05 03:39:39.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/auth-krb5.c 2010-01-24 10:29:25.000000000 +0000 +@@ -166,8 +166,13 @@ + + len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; + authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s", ++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++#else + snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -219,15 +224,22 @@ + #ifndef HEIMDAL + krb5_error_code + ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { +- int tmpfd, ret; ++ int ret; + char ccname[40]; + mode_t old_umask; ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d"; ++#else ++ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX"; ++ int tmpfd; ++#endif + + ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), +- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); ++ cctemplate, geteuid()); + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) + return ENOMEM; + ++#ifndef USE_CCAPI + old_umask = umask(0177); + tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); + umask(old_umask); +@@ -242,6 +254,7 @@ + return errno; + } + close(tmpfd); ++#endif + + return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); + } +Index: openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c 2006-09-01 06:38:36.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + int len; ++ const char *new_ccname; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { + debug("No credentials stored"); +@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@ + return; + } + +- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); ++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); ++ + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; +- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = NULL; ++#else ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@ + return; + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ++ ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_principal principal = NULL; ++ char *name = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, ++ &principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { ++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { ++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ ++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ ++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ++ ccache))) { ++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", +@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@ + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, +- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds + }; + + #endif /* KRB5 */ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/sshd.c 2009-06-21 11:26:17.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c 2010-01-24 10:30:18.000000000 +0000 +@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ + #include "roaming.h" + #include "version.h" + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++#include ++#endif ++ + #ifdef LIBWRAP + #include + #include +@@ -1531,10 +1535,13 @@ + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; + } ++#ifndef GSSAPI ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; + } ++#endif + if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); +@@ -1818,6 +1825,60 @@ + /* Log the connection. */ + verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++ /* ++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if ++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched ++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not ++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from ++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. ++ * ++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an ++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating ++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the ++ * same session (bad). ++ * ++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us ++ * automatically. ++ * ++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored ++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). ++ */ ++ { ++ OSStatus err = 0; ++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0; ++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; ++ ++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ else ++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", ++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); ++ ++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) ++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " ++ "assuming inetd created the session for us."); ++ else { ++ debug("Creating new security session..."); ++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ ++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, ++ &sattrs); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ else ++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", ++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* + * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side + * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is +@@ -2195,12 +2256,61 @@ + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { ++ char *orig; ++ char *gss = NULL; ++ char *newstr = NULL; ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising ++ * the other key exchange algorithms ++ */ ++ ++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) ++ orig = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_keyex) ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ else ++ gss = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss && orig) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ else if (gss) ++ newstr = gss; ++ else if (orig) ++ newstr = orig; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host ++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only ++ * host key algorithm we support ++ */ ++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; ++ ++ if (newstr) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; ++ else ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* start key exchange */ + kex = kex_setup(myproposal); + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; +Index: openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/configure.ac 2009-09-11 05:56:08.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac 2010-01-24 10:29:25.000000000 +0000 +@@ -477,6 +477,30 @@ + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1, + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], ++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" ++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, ++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ], ++ [cc_context_t c; ++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], ++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, ++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) ++ fi], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] ++ ) + m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv) + AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [], + AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) +Index: openssh-5.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi +=================================================================== +--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 2010-01-24 10:38:43.000000000 +0000 +@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ ++20100124 ++ - [ sshconnect2.c ] ++ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to ++ Colin Watson ++ - [ clientloop.c ] ++ Protect credentials updated code with suitable #ifdefs. Thanks to Colin ++ Watson ++ ++20090615 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c ++ sshd.c ] ++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review ++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs ++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled ++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange ++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value ++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust ++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled ++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list ++ Cast data.length before printing ++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL ++ ++20090201 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h ++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ] ++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user ++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server ++ ++20080404 ++ - [ gss-serv.c ] ++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow ++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav ++ Stoichkov ++ ++20070317 ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a ++ function ++ ++20061220 ++ - [ servconf.c ] ++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and ++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson. ++ ++20060910 ++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ++ ssh-gss.h ] ++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms ++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ] ++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of ++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines. ++ ++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ] ++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample ++ configuration files ++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ] ++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf() ++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client ++ ++20060909 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ] ++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server ++ only, where they belong ++ ++ ++20060829 ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment ++ variable ++ ++20060828 ++ - [ gss-genr.c ] ++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem ++ ++ ++20060818 ++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ] ++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled ++ ++ ++20060421 ++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ] ++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to ++ fix compiler errors/warnings ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ] ++ fix uninitialized variable warnings ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ gssgenr.c ] ++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue) ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ ++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c ++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ sshconnect2.c ] ++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/Makefile.in 2009-08-28 01:47:38.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in 2010-01-24 10:30:18.000000000 +0000 +@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ + atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \ + kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \ +- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o ++ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \ ++ kexgssc.o + + SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ + sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ +@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \ + monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \ + auth-krb5.o \ +- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ ++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ + audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ + roaming_common.o +Index: openssh-5.3p1/gss-genr.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/gss-genr.c 2009-06-22 07:11:07.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/gss-genr.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@ + #include "buffer.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "ssh2.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + + extern u_char *session_id2; + extern u_int session_id2_len; + ++typedef struct { ++ char *encoded; ++ gss_OID oid; ++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; ++ ++/* ++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the ++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines ++ */ ++ ++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; ++ ++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { ++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program ++ * ++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting ++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism ++ */ ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { ++ gss_OID_set gss_supported; ++ OM_uint32 min_status; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, ++ host, client)); ++} ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, ++ const char *host, const char *client) { ++ Buffer buf; ++ size_t i; ++ int oidpos, enclen; ++ char *mechs, *encoded; ++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ char deroid[2]; ++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); ++ EVP_MD_CTX md; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) ++ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); ++ xfree(gss_enc2oid); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * ++ (gss_supported->count + 1)); ++ ++ buffer_init(&buf); ++ ++ oidpos = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { ++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && ++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { ++ ++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; ++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; ++ ++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].length); ++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); ++ ++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), ++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ ++ if (oidpos != 0) ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; ++ oidpos++; ++ } ++ } ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; ++ ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); ++ ++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_free(&buf); ++ ++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { ++ xfree(mechs); ++ mechs = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (mechs); ++} ++ ++gss_OID ++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { ++ int i = 0; ++ ++ switch (kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ } ++ ++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && ++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) ++ i++; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); ++ ++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; ++} ++ + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ + int + ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ + } + + ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, ++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, + 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); + +@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ + } + + OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_name_t gssname; ++ OM_uint32 status; ++ gss_OID_set oidset; ++ ++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; ++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); ++ ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, ++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); ++ ++ if (!ctx->major) ++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, ++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ ++ if (ctx->major) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ ++ return(ctx->major); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + { ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ + return (ctx->major); + } + ++/* Priviledged when used by server */ ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++{ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, ++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ ++ return (ctx->major); ++} ++ + void + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, + const char *context) +@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ + } + + int +-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) ++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, ++ const char *client) + { + gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; ++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ ctx = &intctx; + + /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ + if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && +@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) ++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); ++ + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, + NULL); +@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + } + +- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + + return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; ++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ static gss_name_t name; ++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; ++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; ++ int equal; ++ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; ++ ++ now = time(NULL); ++ ++ if (ctxt) { ++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); ++ ++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { ++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; ++ saved_lifetime+= now; ++ } else { ++ /* Handle the error */ ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (now - last_call < 10) ++ return 0; ++ ++ last_call = now; ++ ++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) ++ return 0; ++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/kex.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/kex.c 2009-06-21 09:15:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/kex.c 2010-01-24 10:31:14.000000000 +0000 +@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ + #include "dispatch.h" + #include "monitor.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) + # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 +@@ -325,6 +329,20 @@ + k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256; + k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256(); + #endif ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++#endif + } else + fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name); + } +Index: openssh-5.3p1/kex.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/kex.h 2009-06-21 09:15:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/kex.h 2010-01-24 10:35:28.000000000 +0000 +@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ + KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_MAX + }; + +@@ -121,6 +124,12 @@ + sig_atomic_t done; + int flags; + const EVP_MD *evp_md; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ int gss_deleg_creds; ++ int gss_trust_dns; ++ char *gss_host; ++ char *gss_client; ++#endif + char *client_version_string; + char *server_version_string; + int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); +@@ -143,6 +152,11 @@ + void kexgex_client(Kex *); + void kexgex_server(Kex *); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++void kexgss_client(Kex *); ++void kexgss_server(Kex *); ++#endif ++ + void + kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, + BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); +Index: openssh-5.3p1/kexgssc.c +=================================================================== +--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/kexgssc.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++ ++void ++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; ++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; ++ DH *dh; ++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *p = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *g = NULL; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; ++ u_char *empty = ""; ++ char *msg; ++ char *lang; ++ int type = 0; ++ int first = 1; ++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) ++ == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); ++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ packet_put_int(min); ++ packet_put_int(nbits); ++ packet_put_int(max); ++ ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ ++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(p); ++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(g); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) ++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); ++ ++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ ++ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); ++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, ++ &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ xfree(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (first) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ first = 0; ++ } else { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ do { ++ type = packet_read(); ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ serverhostkey = ++ packet_get_string(&slen); ++ } ++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); ++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ msg_tok.length = strlen; ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if (packet_get_char()) { ++ recv_tok.value= ++ packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ /* No token included */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ maj_status = packet_get_int(); ++ min_status = packet_get_int(); ++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ token_ptr = &recv_tok; ++ } else { ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ ++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); ++ ++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); ++ if (kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ xfree(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ dh->pub_key, /* e */ ++ dh_server_pub, /* f */ ++ shared_secret, /* K */ ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->evp_md, ++ kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ dh_server_pub, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ xfree(msg_tok.value); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ xfree(serverhostkey); ++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); ++ ++ /* save session id */ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++} ++ ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/kexgsss.c +=================================================================== +--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/kexgsss.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++ ++void ++kexgss_server(Kex *kex) ++{ ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ /* ++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an ++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific ++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently ++ * activating this non-standard behaviour. ++ */ ++ ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; ++ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ DH *dh; ++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; ++ int type = 0; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) ++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) ++ xfree(mechs); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ min = packet_get_int(); ++ nbits = packet_get_int(); ++ max = packet_get_int(); ++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); ++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) ++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, nbits, max); ++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); ++ if (dh == NULL) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_write_wait(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); ++ type = packet_read(); ++ switch(type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: ++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) ++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ ++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ break; ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect( ++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ ++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, ++ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); ++ ++ xfree(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length > 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); ++ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); ++ if (kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ xfree(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ ++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->evp_md, ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh_client_pub, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); ++ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ } else { ++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++} ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/key.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/key.c 2008-11-03 08:24:17.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/key.c 2010-01-24 10:30:18.000000000 +0000 +@@ -764,6 +764,8 @@ + return KEY_RSA; + } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) { + return KEY_DSA; ++ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) { ++ return KEY_NULL; + } + debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name); + return KEY_UNSPEC; +Index: openssh-5.3p1/key.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/key.h 2008-06-12 19:40:35.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/key.h 2010-01-24 10:30:18.000000000 +0000 +@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ + KEY_RSA1, + KEY_RSA, + KEY_DSA, ++ KEY_NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC + }; + enum fp_type { +Index: openssh-5.3p1/monitor.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/monitor.c 2009-06-21 09:58:46.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/monitor.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ + int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); + #endif + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +@@ -241,6 +243,7 @@ + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE + {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata}, +@@ -253,6 +256,12 @@ + }; + + struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, +@@ -357,6 +366,10 @@ + /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; + +@@ -443,6 +456,10 @@ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); +@@ -1706,6 +1723,13 @@ + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); + kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); +@@ -1911,6 +1935,9 @@ + OM_uint32 major; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + goid.length = len; + +@@ -1938,6 +1965,9 @@ + OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + in.length = len; + major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); +@@ -1955,6 +1985,7 @@ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); + } + return (0); + } +@@ -1966,6 +1997,9 @@ + OM_uint32 ret; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + gssbuf.length = len; + mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); +@@ -1992,7 +2026,11 @@ + { + int authenticated; + +- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ authenticated = authctxt->valid && ++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); +@@ -2005,6 +2043,74 @@ + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc data; ++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 major, minor; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ data.length = len; ++ if (data.length != 20) ++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, ++ (int) data.length); ++ ++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ ++ if (session_id2_len == 0) { ++ session_id2_len = data.length; ++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); ++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); ++ } ++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); ++ ++ xfree(data.value); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, major); ++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); ++ ++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); ++ ++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { ++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int ok; ++ ++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ ++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); ++ ++ xfree(store.filename); ++ xfree(store.envvar); ++ xfree(store.envval); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, ok); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ return(0); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #ifdef JPAKE +Index: openssh-5.3p1/monitor.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/monitor.h 2008-11-05 05:20:46.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/monitor.h 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, +Index: openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c 2009-06-22 07:11:07.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ + } + + int +-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + Buffer m; + int authenticated = 0; +@@ -1265,6 +1265,51 @@ + debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++OM_uint32 ++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ OM_uint32 major; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ ++ major = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); ++ hash->length = len; ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return(major); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ int ok; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ ++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return (ok); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #ifdef JPAKE +Index: openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h 2009-03-05 13:58:22.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@ + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM +Index: openssh-5.3p1/ssh-gss.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/ssh-gss.h 2007-06-12 14:40:39.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-gss.h 2010-01-24 10:36:10.000000000 +0000 +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */ + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@ + + #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" ++ + typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; ++ struct passwd *owner; + void *data; + } ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@ + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; ++ gss_name_t name; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int used; ++ int updated; + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@ + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + + typedef struct { +@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@ + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ +- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ ++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ + } Gssctxt; + + extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; ++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; + + int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); + void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@ + void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); + + /* In the server */ ++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, ++ const char *); ++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); ++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); ++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); + void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + ++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); ++ ++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ +Index: openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/ssh_config 2009-02-21 01:45:02.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config 2010-01-24 10:30:18.000000000 +0000 +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ + # HostbasedAuthentication no + # GSSAPIAuthentication no + # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no ++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++# GSSAPITrustDNS no + # BatchMode no + # CheckHostIP yes + # AddressFamily any +Index: openssh-5.3p1/clientloop.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-5.3p1.orig/clientloop.c 2009-08-28 02:21:07.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/clientloop.c 2010-01-24 10:37:05.000000000 +0000 +@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ + #include "msg.h" + #include "roaming.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + /* import options */ + extern Options options; + +@@ -1430,6 +1434,15 @@ + /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ + if (!rekeying) { + channel_after_select(readset, writeset); ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { ++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); ++ need_rekeying = 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { + debug("need rekeying"); + xxx_kex->done = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3-65-gdbad