Security bump (bug #543552)

(Portage version: 2.2.18/cvs/Linux x86_64, signed Manifest commit with key 0x981CA6FC)

5 files changed, 1346 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/ChangeLog b/dev-libs/openssl/ChangeLog
index ebc3daa80842..9241a6d632be 100644
--- a/dev-libs/openssl/ChangeLog
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
 # ChangeLog for dev-libs/openssl
 # Copyright 1999-2015 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/dev-libs/openssl/ChangeLog,v 1.631 2015/03/04 16:41:25 vapier Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/dev-libs/openssl/ChangeLog,v 1.632 2015/03/19 14:28:24 polynomial-c Exp $
+
+*openssl-1.0.2-r3 (19 Mar 2015)
+*openssl-1.0.1l-r1 (19 Mar 2015)
+
+  19 Mar 2015; Lars Wendler <polynomial-c@gentoo.org>
+  +openssl-1.0.1l-r1.ebuild, +openssl-1.0.2-r3.ebuild,
+  +files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch,
+  +files/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2015-0291.patch:
+  Security bump (bug #543552).
 
   04 Mar 2015; Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> openssl-1.0.2-r2.ebuild:
   Require recent lksctp-tools #506046#8 by Maciej Szmigiero.
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..811f573a1107
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+--- openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
++++ openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@
+ 	case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+ 		result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
+ 		break;
++	case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
++		result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
++		break;
+ 	case V_ASN1_NULL:
+ 		result = 0;	/* They do not have content. */
+ 		break;
+--- openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
++++ openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+@@ -130,11 +130,17 @@
+ 	{
+ 	ASN1_TLC c;
+ 	ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL;
+-	if (!pval)
+-		pval = &ptmpval;
+ 	asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
+-	if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) 
+-		return *pval;
++	if (pval && *pval && it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
++	    ptmpval = *pval;
++	if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&ptmpval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) {
++	    if (pval && it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) {
++		if (*pval)
++		    ASN1_item_free(*pval, it);
++		*pval = ptmpval;
++	    }
++	    return ptmpval;
++	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -311,9 +317,16 @@
+ 		if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+ 				goto auxerr;
+ 
+-		/* Allocate structure */
+-		if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it))
+-			{
++		if (*pval) {
++		    /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
++		    i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
++		    if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
++			tt = it->templates + i;
++			pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
++			ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
++			asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
++		    }
++		} else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
+ 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
+ 						ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ 			goto err;
+@@ -407,6 +420,17 @@
+ 		if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+ 				goto auxerr;
+ 
++		/* Free up and zero any ADB found */
++		for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
++		    if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
++			const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
++			ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
++			seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
++			pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
++			ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
++		    }
++		}
++
+ 		/* Get each field entry */
+ 		for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
+ 			{
+--- openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
++++ openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,25 @@
+ 	PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
+ 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
+ 
++    if (p7 == NULL) {
++	PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++	return NULL;
++    }
++    /*
++     * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
++     * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
++     *
++     * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
++     * error.
++     *
++     * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
++     * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
++     */
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
++	PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++	return NULL;
++    }
++
+ 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+ 
+@@ -433,6 +452,16 @@
+        unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
+        int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
+ 
++    if (p7 == NULL) {
++	PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++	return NULL;
++    }
++    
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
++	PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++	return NULL;
++    }
++
+ 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+ 
+@@ -752,6 +781,16 @@
+ 	STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL;
+ 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
+ 
++    if (p7 == NULL) {
++	PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++	return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
++	PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++	return 0;
++    }
++
+ 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+@@ -796,6 +835,7 @@
+ 		/* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+ 		if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
+ 			M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
++			os = NULL;
+ 			p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+@@ -806,6 +846,7 @@
+ 		if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached)
+ 			{
+ 			M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
++			os = NULL;
+ 			p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
+ 			}
+ 		break;
+@@ -878,24 +919,31 @@
+ 		M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
+ 		}
+ 
+-	if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
+-		{
++	if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
++	    /*
++	     * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
++	     * digested data support is broken.
++	     */
++	    if (os == NULL)
++		goto err;
++	    if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
+ 		char *cont;
+ 		long contlen;
+-		btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+-		if (btmp == NULL)
+-			{
+-			PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
+-			goto err;
+-			}
++		btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
++		if (btmp == NULL) {
++		    PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
++		    goto err;
++		}
+ 		contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+-		/* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
++		/*
++		 * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+ 		 * instead of making an extra copy.
+ 		 */
+ 		BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+ 		BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+ 		ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+-		}
++	    }
++	}
+ 	ret=1;
+ err:
+ 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+@@ -971,6 +1019,16 @@
+ 	STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
+ 	X509 *x509;
+ 
++    if (p7 == NULL) {
++	PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++	return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
++	PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++	return 0;
++    }
++
+ 	if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
+ 		{
+ 		cert=p7->d.sign->cert;
+--- openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
+ 
+ 	switch (cmd)
+ 		{
++	/* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */
+ 	case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
+ 		if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
+ 			{
+@@ -459,6 +460,8 @@
+ 
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
+ 	{
++	if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++		return NULL;
+ 	if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
+ 		{
+ 		return(p7->d.sign->signer_info);
+--- openssl-1.0.1l/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
++++ openssl-1.0.1l/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
+@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@
+ persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use
+ of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged.
+ 
++Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify B<*px> if an error occurs.
++If parsing succeeds then B<*px> is freed (if it is not NULL) and then
++set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result B<*px>
++B<must not> be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to
++free an invalid pointer.
++
+ i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL,
+ if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error
+ then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the
+@@ -210,7 +216,9 @@
+ 
+ d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure
+ or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
+-L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. 
++L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used
++with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not
++modified in the event of error.
+ 
+ i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative
+ value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by
+--- openssl-1.0.1l/ssl/s2_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.1l/ssl/s2_lib.c
+@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@
+ 
+ 		OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
+ 		    && s->session->master_key_length
+-		    < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
++		    <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+ 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
+ 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
+ 		c++;
+--- openssl-1.0.1l/ssl/s2_srvr.c
++++ openssl-1.0.1l/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+@@ -454,10 +454,6 @@
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
+ 		return(-1);
+ 		}
+-	i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc,
+-		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+-		(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+-
+ 	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
+ 	
+ 	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
+@@ -475,21 +471,59 @@
+ 	else
+ 		ek=5;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
++	 * 1 byte message type
++	 * 3 bytes cipher
++	 * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
++	 * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
++	 * 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
++	 * clear key
++	 * encrypted key
++	 * key args
++	 *
++	 * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
++	 * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
++	 * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
++	 * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
++	 * must be zero).
++	 */
++	if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
++	    (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
++	    ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
++	    SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
++	    return -1;
++	}
++	/*
++	 * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
++	 * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
++	 * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
++	 */
++	if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
++	    (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
++	    ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
++	    SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
++	    return -1;
++	}
++
++	i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
++				    &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
++				    &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
++				    (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
++				    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
++
+ 	/* bad decrypt */
+ #if 1
+ 	/* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
+ 	 * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
+-	if ((i < 0) ||
+-		((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+-		|| (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i !=
+-			(unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
+-		{
++	if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
++			|| (is_export && i != ek))) {
+ 		ERR_clear_error();
+ 		if (is_export)
+ 			i=ek;
+ 		else
+ 			i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0)
++		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+ #else
+@@ -513,7 +547,8 @@
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
++	if (is_export)
++		i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ 
+ 	if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 		{
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2015-0291.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2015-0291.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..852d06e9181a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2015-0291.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
+--- openssl-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@
+     case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+         result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
+         break;
++    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
++        result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
++        break;
+     case V_ASN1_NULL:
+         result = 0;             /* They do not have content. */
+         break;
+--- openssl-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+@@ -140,11 +140,17 @@
+ {
+     ASN1_TLC c;
+     ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL;
+-    if (!pval)
+-        pval = &ptmpval;
+     asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
+-    if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0)
+-        return *pval;
++    if (pval && *pval && it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
++        ptmpval = *pval;
++    if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&ptmpval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) {
++        if (pval && it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) {
++            if (*pval)
++                ASN1_item_free(*pval, it);
++            *pval = ptmpval;
++        }
++        return ptmpval;
++    }
+     return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -304,9 +310,16 @@
+     case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+             goto auxerr;
+-
+-        /* Allocate structure */
+-        if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
++        if (*pval) {
++            /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
++            i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
++            if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
++                tt = it->templates + i;
++                pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
++                ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
++                asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
++            }
++        } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
+             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+             goto err;
+         }
+@@ -386,6 +399,17 @@
+         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+             goto auxerr;
+ 
++        /* Free up and zero any ADB found */
++        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
++            if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
++                const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
++                ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
++                seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
++                pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
++                ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
++            }
++        }
++
+         /* Get each field entry */
+         for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+             const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+--- openssl-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+@@ -261,6 +261,25 @@
+     PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
+     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+ 
++    if (p7 == NULL) {
++        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++    /*
++     * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
++     * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
++     *
++     * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
++     * error.
++     *
++     * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
++     * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
++     */
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
++        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+ 
+@@ -411,6 +430,16 @@
+     unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
+     int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
+ 
++    if (p7 == NULL) {
++        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
++        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+ 
+@@ -707,6 +736,16 @@
+     STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL;
+     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+ 
++    if (p7 == NULL) {
++        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
++        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+@@ -746,6 +785,7 @@
+         /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+         if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
+             M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
++            os = NULL;
+             p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
+         }
+         break;
+@@ -755,6 +795,7 @@
+         /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+         if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) {
+             M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
++            os = NULL;
+             p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
+         }
+         break;
+@@ -820,22 +861,30 @@
+         M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
+     }
+ 
+-    if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
+-        char *cont;
+-        long contlen;
+-        btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+-        if (btmp == NULL) {
+-            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
+-            goto err;
+-        }
+-        contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
++    if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
+         /*
+-         * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+-         * instead of making an extra copy.
++         * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
++         * digested data support is broken.
+          */
+-        BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+-        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+-        ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
++        if (os == NULL)
++            goto err;
++        if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
++            char *cont;
++            long contlen;
++            btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
++            if (btmp == NULL) {
++                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
++                goto err;
++            }
++            contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
++            /*
++             * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
++             * instead of making an extra copy.
++             */
++            BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
++            BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
++            ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
++        }
+     }
+     ret = 1;
+  err:
+@@ -910,6 +959,16 @@
+     STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
+     X509 *x509;
+ 
++    if (p7 == NULL) {
++        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
++        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
+         cert = p7->d.sign->cert;
+     } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
+--- openssl-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+     nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ 
+     switch (cmd) {
++    /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */
+     case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
+         if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
+             ret = p7->detached = (int)larg;
+@@ -444,6 +445,8 @@
+ 
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
+ {
++    if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++        return NULL;
+     if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
+         return (p7->d.sign->signer_info);
+     } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
+--- openssl-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+@@ -698,9 +698,10 @@
+         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+         return -1;
+     }
+-    if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey))
++    if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) {
+         /* Carry on */
+         return 2;
++    }
+     return -1;
+ }
+ 
+--- openssl-1.0.2/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
++++ openssl-1.0.2/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
+@@ -207,6 +207,12 @@
+ persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use
+ of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged.
+ 
++Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify B<*px> if an error occurs.
++If parsing succeeds then B<*px> is freed (if it is not NULL) and then
++set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result B<*px>
++B<must not> be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to
++free an invalid pointer.
++
+ i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL,
+ if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error
+ then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the
+@@ -233,7 +239,9 @@
+ 
+ d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure
+ or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
+-L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. 
++L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used
++with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not
++modified in the event of error.
+ 
+ i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative
+ value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by
+--- openssl-1.0.2/ssl/d1_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/ssl/d1_lib.c
+@@ -543,6 +543,9 @@
+ {
+     int ret;
+ 
++    /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
++    SSL_clear(s);
++
+     SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
+     s->d1->listen = 1;
+ 
+--- openssl-1.0.2/ssl/s2_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/ssl/s2_lib.c
+@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@
+ 
+         OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
+                        && s->session->master_key_length
+-                       < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
++                       <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+         EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+                          s->session->master_key_length);
+         EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &c, 1);
+--- openssl-1.0.2/ssl/s2_srvr.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+@@ -454,11 +454,6 @@
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
+         return (-1);
+     }
+-    i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
+-                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+-                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+-                                (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
+-                                RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ 
+     is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
+ 
+@@ -475,23 +470,61 @@
+     } else
+         ek = 5;
+ 
++    /*
++     * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
++     * 1 byte message type
++     * 3 bytes cipher
++     * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
++     * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
++     * 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
++     * clear key
++     * encrypted key
++     * key args
++     *
++     * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
++     * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
++     * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
++     * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
++     * must be zero).
++     */
++    if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
++        (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
++        ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
++        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
++        return -1;
++    }
++    /*
++     * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
++     * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
++     * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
++     */
++    if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
++        (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
++        ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
++        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
++                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
++                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
++                                (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
++                                RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
++
+     /* bad decrypt */
+ # if 1
+     /*
+      * If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master
+      * secret (Bleichenbacher attack)
+      */
+-    if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+-                    || (is_export && ((i != ek)
+-                                      || (s->s2->tmp.clear +
+-                                          (unsigned int)i != (unsigned int)
+-                                          EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) {
++    if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
++                    || (is_export && i != ek))) {
+         ERR_clear_error();
+         if (is_export)
+             i = ek;
+         else
+             i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, i) <= 0)
++        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0)
+             return 0;
+     }
+ # else
+@@ -513,7 +546,7 @@
+ # endif
+ 
+     if (is_export)
+-        i += s->s2->tmp.clear;
++        i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ 
+     if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+         ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+--- openssl-1.0.2/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@
+ 
+             i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
+             if (i <= 0) {
+-                if (i < 0) {
++                if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
+                     OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
+                     wb->buf = NULL;
+                 }
+--- openssl-1.0.2/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -2251,10 +2251,17 @@
+     if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+         int idx = -1;
+         EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
+-        if (n)
++        if (n) {
+             n2s(p, i);
+-        else
++        } else {
++            if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
++                al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
++                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
++                       SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
++                goto f_err;
++            }
+             i = 0;
++        }
+         if (n && n != i + 2) {
+             if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
+                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+--- openssl-1.0.2/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -2965,6 +2965,7 @@
+     if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
+         OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+         s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
++        s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+     }
+     /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+     for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+@@ -3618,6 +3619,7 @@
+     if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
+         OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+         c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
++        c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+     }
+     /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+     if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
+@@ -3640,12 +3642,14 @@
+         preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+     }
+     nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+-    if (!nmatch)
+-        return 1;
+-    salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+-    if (!salgs)
+-        return 0;
+-    nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
++    if (nmatch) {
++        salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
++        if (!salgs)
++            return 0;
++        nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
++    } else {
++        salgs = NULL;
++    }
+     c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+     c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+     return 1;
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-1.0.1l-r1.ebuild b/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-1.0.1l-r1.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..caf863c4f090
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-1.0.1l-r1.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2015 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-1.0.1l-r1.ebuild,v 1.1 2015/03/19 14:28:24 polynomial-c Exp $
+
+EAPI="4"
+
+inherit eutils flag-o-matic toolchain-funcs multilib multilib-minimal
+
+REV="1.7"
+DESCRIPTION="full-strength general purpose cryptography library (including SSL and TLS)"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.openssl.org/"
+SRC_URI="mirror://openssl/source/${P}.tar.gz
+	http://cvs.pld-linux.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/packages/${PN}/${PN}-c_rehash.sh?rev=${REV} -> ${PN}-c_rehash.sh.${REV}"
+
+LICENSE="openssl"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~amd64-fbsd ~sparc-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~arm-linux ~x86-linux"
+IUSE="bindist gmp kerberos rfc3779 cpu_flags_x86_sse2 static-libs test +tls-heartbeat vanilla zlib"
+
+# The blocks are temporary just to make sure people upgrade to a
+# version that lack runtime version checking.  We'll drop them in
+# the future.
+RDEPEND="gmp? ( >=dev-libs/gmp-5.1.3-r1[static-libs(+)?,${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
+	zlib? ( >=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.8-r1[static-libs(+)?,${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
+	kerberos? ( >=app-crypt/mit-krb5-1.11.4[${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
+	abi_x86_32? (
+		!<=app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs-20140406-r3
+		!app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[-abi_x86_32(-)]
+	)
+	!<net-misc/openssh-5.9_p1-r4
+	!<net-libs/neon-0.29.6-r1"
+DEPEND="${RDEPEND}
+	sys-apps/diffutils
+	>=dev-lang/perl-5
+	test? ( sys-devel/bc )"
+PDEPEND="app-misc/ca-certificates"
+
+src_unpack() {
+	unpack ${P}.tar.gz
+	SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
+	sed \
+		-e "/^DIR=/s:=.*:=${EPREFIX}${SSL_CNF_DIR}:" \
+		-e "s:SSL_CMD=/usr:SSL_CMD=${EPREFIX}/usr:" \
+		"${DISTDIR}"/${PN}-c_rehash.sh.${REV} \
+		> "${WORKDIR}"/c_rehash || die #416717
+}
+
+MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
+	usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+)
+
+src_prepare() {
+	# Make sure we only ever touch Makefile.org and avoid patching a file
+	# that gets blown away anyways by the Configure script in src_configure
+	rm -f Makefile
+
+	if ! use vanilla ; then
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.0a-ldflags.patch #327421
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.0d-windres.patch #373743
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.0h-pkg-config.patch
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.1-parallel-build.patch
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.1-x32.patch
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.1h-ipv6.patch
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.1e-s_client-verify.patch #472584
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.1f-revert-alpha-perl-generation.patch #499086
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch #543552
+		epatch_user #332661
+	fi
+
+	# disable fips in the build
+	# make sure the man pages are suffixed #302165
+	# don't bother building man pages if they're disabled
+	sed -i \
+		-e '/DIRS/s: fips : :g' \
+		-e '/^MANSUFFIX/s:=.*:=ssl:' \
+		-e '/^MAKEDEPPROG/s:=.*:=$(CC):' \
+		-e $(has noman FEATURES \
+			&& echo '/^install:/s:install_docs::' \
+			|| echo '/^MANDIR=/s:=.*:='${EPREFIX}'/usr/share/man:') \
+		Makefile.org \
+		|| die
+	# show the actual commands in the log
+	sed -i '/^SET_X/s:=.*:=set -x:' Makefile.shared
+
+	# since we're forcing $(CC) as makedep anyway, just fix
+	# the conditional as always-on
+	# helps clang (#417795), and versioned gcc (#499818)
+	sed -i 's/expr.*MAKEDEPEND.*;/true;/' util/domd || die
+
+	# quiet out unknown driver argument warnings since openssl
+	# doesn't have well-split CFLAGS and we're making it even worse
+	# and 'make depend' uses -Werror for added fun (#417795 again)
+	[[ ${CC} == *clang* ]] && append-flags -Qunused-arguments
+
+	# allow openssl to be cross-compiled
+	cp "${FILESDIR}"/gentoo.config-1.0.1 gentoo.config || die
+	chmod a+rx gentoo.config
+
+	append-flags -fno-strict-aliasing
+	append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
+
+	sed -i '1s,^:$,#!'${EPREFIX}'/usr/bin/perl,' Configure #141906
+	# The config script does stupid stuff to prompt the user.  Kill it.
+	sed -i '/stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste/d' config || die
+	./config --test-sanity || die "I AM NOT SANE"
+
+	multilib_copy_sources
+}
+
+multilib_src_configure() {
+	unset APPS #197996
+	unset SCRIPTS #312551
+	unset CROSS_COMPILE #311473
+
+	tc-export CC AR RANLIB RC
+
+	# Clean out patent-or-otherwise-encumbered code
+	# Camellia: Royalty Free            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camellia_(cipher)
+	# IDEA:     Expired                 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Data_Encryption_Algorithm
+	# EC:       ????????? ??/??/2015    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography
+	# MDC2:     Expired                 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MDC-2
+	# RC5:      5,724,428 03/03/2015    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC5
+
+	use_ssl() { usex $1 "enable-${2:-$1}" "no-${2:-$1}" " ${*:3}" ; }
+	echoit() { echo "$@" ; "$@" ; }
+
+	local krb5=$(has_version app-crypt/mit-krb5 && echo "MIT" || echo "Heimdal")
+
+	# See if our toolchain supports __uint128_t.  If so, it's 64bit
+	# friendly and can use the nicely optimized code paths. #460790
+	local ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
+	# Disable it for now though #469976
+	#if ! use bindist ; then
+	#	echo "__uint128_t i;" > "${T}"/128.c
+	#	if ${CC} ${CFLAGS} -c "${T}"/128.c -o /dev/null >&/dev/null ; then
+	#		ec_nistp_64_gcc_128="enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128"
+	#	fi
+	#fi
+
+	local sslout=$(./gentoo.config)
+	einfo "Use configuration ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
+	local config="Configure"
+	[[ -z ${sslout} ]] && config="config"
+
+	echoit \
+	./${config} \
+		${sslout} \
+		$(use cpu_flags_x86_sse2 || echo "no-sse2") \
+		enable-camellia \
+		$(use_ssl !bindist ec) \
+		${ec_nistp_64_gcc_128} \
+		enable-idea \
+		enable-mdc2 \
+		$(use_ssl !bindist rc5) \
+		enable-tlsext \
+		$(use_ssl gmp gmp -lgmp) \
+		$(use_ssl kerberos krb5 --with-krb5-flavor=${krb5}) \
+		$(use_ssl rfc3779) \
+		$(use_ssl tls-heartbeat heartbeats) \
+		$(use_ssl zlib) \
+		--prefix="${EPREFIX}"/usr \
+		--openssldir="${EPREFIX}"${SSL_CNF_DIR} \
+		--libdir=$(get_libdir) \
+		shared threads \
+		|| die
+
+	# Clean out hardcoded flags that openssl uses
+	local CFLAG=$(grep ^CFLAG= Makefile | LC_ALL=C sed \
+		-e 's:^CFLAG=::' \
+		-e 's:-fomit-frame-pointer ::g' \
+		-e 's:-O[0-9] ::g' \
+		-e 's:-march=[-a-z0-9]* ::g' \
+		-e 's:-mcpu=[-a-z0-9]* ::g' \
+		-e 's:-m[a-z0-9]* ::g' \
+	)
+	sed -i \
+		-e "/^CFLAG/s|=.*|=${CFLAG} ${CFLAGS}|" \
+		-e "/^SHARED_LDFLAGS=/s|$| ${LDFLAGS}|" \
+		Makefile || die
+}
+
+multilib_src_compile() {
+	# depend is needed to use $confopts; it also doesn't matter
+	# that it's -j1 as the code itself serializes subdirs
+	emake -j1 depend
+	emake all
+	# rehash is needed to prep the certs/ dir; do this
+	# separately to avoid parallel build issues.
+	emake rehash
+}
+
+multilib_src_test() {
+	emake -j1 test
+}
+
+multilib_src_install() {
+	emake INSTALL_PREFIX="${D}" install
+}
+
+multilib_src_install_all() {
+	dobin "${WORKDIR}"/c_rehash #333117
+	dodoc CHANGES* FAQ NEWS README doc/*.txt doc/c-indentation.el
+	dohtml -r doc/*
+	use rfc3779 && dodoc engines/ccgost/README.gost
+
+	# This is crappy in that the static archives are still built even
+	# when USE=static-libs.  But this is due to a failing in the openssl
+	# build system: the static archives are built as PIC all the time.
+	# Only way around this would be to manually configure+compile openssl
+	# twice; once with shared lib support enabled and once without.
+	use static-libs || rm -f "${ED}"/usr/lib*/lib*.a
+
+	# create the certs directory
+	dodir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs
+	cp -RP certs/* "${ED}"${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs/ || die
+	rm -r "${ED}"${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs/{demo,expired}
+
+	# Namespace openssl programs to prevent conflicts with other man pages
+	cd "${ED}"/usr/share/man
+	local m d s
+	for m in $(find . -type f | xargs grep -L '#include') ; do
+		d=${m%/*} ; d=${d#./} ; m=${m##*/}
+		[[ ${m} == openssl.1* ]] && continue
+		[[ -n $(find -L ${d} -type l) ]] && die "erp, broken links already!"
+		mv ${d}/{,ssl-}${m}
+		# fix up references to renamed man pages
+		sed -i '/^[.]SH "SEE ALSO"/,/^[.]/s:\([^(, ]*(1)\):ssl-\1:g' ${d}/ssl-${m}
+		ln -s ssl-${m} ${d}/openssl-${m}
+		# locate any symlinks that point to this man page ... we assume
+		# that any broken links are due to the above renaming
+		for s in $(find -L ${d} -type l) ; do
+			s=${s##*/}
+			rm -f ${d}/${s}
+			ln -s ssl-${m} ${d}/ssl-${s}
+			ln -s ssl-${s} ${d}/openssl-${s}
+		done
+	done
+	[[ -n $(find -L ${d} -type l) ]] && die "broken manpage links found :("
+
+	dodir /etc/sandbox.d #254521
+	echo 'SANDBOX_PREDICT="/dev/crypto"' > "${ED}"/etc/sandbox.d/10openssl
+
+	diropts -m0700
+	keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/private
+}
+
+pkg_preinst() {
+	has_version ${CATEGORY}/${PN}:0.9.8 && return 0
+	preserve_old_lib /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}.so.0.9.8
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	ebegin "Running 'c_rehash ${EROOT%/}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs/' to rebuild hashes #333069"
+	c_rehash "${EROOT%/}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs" >/dev/null
+	eend $?
+
+	has_version ${CATEGORY}/${PN}:0.9.8 && return 0
+	preserve_old_lib_notify /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}.so.0.9.8
+}
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-1.0.2-r3.ebuild b/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-1.0.2-r3.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..effd7811966e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-1.0.2-r3.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2015 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-1.0.2-r3.ebuild,v 1.1 2015/03/19 14:28:24 polynomial-c Exp $
+
+EAPI="4"
+
+inherit eutils flag-o-matic toolchain-funcs multilib multilib-minimal
+
+REV="1.7"
+MY_P=${P/_/-}
+DESCRIPTION="full-strength general purpose cryptography library (including SSL and TLS)"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.openssl.org/"
+SRC_URI="mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz
+	http://cvs.pld-linux.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/packages/${PN}/${PN}-c_rehash.sh?rev=${REV} -> ${PN}-c_rehash.sh.${REV}"
+
+LICENSE="openssl"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~amd64-fbsd ~sparc-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~arm-linux ~x86-linux"
+IUSE="bindist gmp kerberos rfc3779 sctp cpu_flags_x86_sse2 static-libs test +tls-heartbeat vanilla zlib"
+
+# The blocks are temporary just to make sure people upgrade to a
+# version that lack runtime version checking.  We'll drop them in
+# the future.
+RDEPEND="gmp? ( >=dev-libs/gmp-5.1.3-r1[static-libs(+)?,${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
+	zlib? ( >=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.8-r1[static-libs(+)?,${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
+	kerberos? ( >=app-crypt/mit-krb5-1.11.4[${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
+	abi_x86_32? (
+		!<=app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs-20140508
+		!app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[-abi_x86_32(-)]
+	)
+	!<net-misc/openssh-5.9_p1-r4
+	!<net-libs/neon-0.29.6-r1"
+DEPEND="${RDEPEND}
+	sys-apps/diffutils
+	>=dev-lang/perl-5
+	sctp? ( >=net-misc/lksctp-tools-1.0.12 )
+	test? ( sys-devel/bc )"
+PDEPEND="app-misc/ca-certificates"
+
+S="${WORKDIR}/${MY_P}"
+
+MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
+	usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+)
+
+src_prepare() {
+	SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
+	sed \
+		-e "/^DIR=/s:=.*:=${EPREFIX}${SSL_CNF_DIR}:" \
+		-e "s:SSL_CMD=/usr:SSL_CMD=${EPREFIX}/usr:" \
+		"${DISTDIR}"/${PN}-c_rehash.sh.${REV} \
+		> "${WORKDIR}"/c_rehash || die #416717
+
+	# Make sure we only ever touch Makefile.org and avoid patching a file
+	# that gets blown away anyways by the Configure script in src_configure
+	rm -f Makefile
+
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2015-0209.patch #541502
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2015-0288.patch #542038
+	if ! use vanilla ; then
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.0a-ldflags.patch #327421
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.0d-windres.patch #373743
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.2-parallel-build.patch
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.2-ipv6.patch
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.2-s_client-verify.patch #472584
+		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.0.2-CVE-2015-0291.patch
+
+		epatch_user #332661
+	fi
+
+	# disable fips in the build
+	# make sure the man pages are suffixed #302165
+	# don't bother building man pages if they're disabled
+	sed -i \
+		-e '/DIRS/s: fips : :g' \
+		-e '/^MANSUFFIX/s:=.*:=ssl:' \
+		-e '/^MAKEDEPPROG/s:=.*:=$(CC):' \
+		-e $(has noman FEATURES \
+			&& echo '/^install:/s:install_docs::' \
+			|| echo '/^MANDIR=/s:=.*:='${EPREFIX}'/usr/share/man:') \
+		Makefile.org \
+		|| die
+	# show the actual commands in the log
+	sed -i '/^SET_X/s:=.*:=set -x:' Makefile.shared
+
+	# since we're forcing $(CC) as makedep anyway, just fix
+	# the conditional as always-on
+	# helps clang (#417795), and versioned gcc (#499818)
+	sed -i 's/expr.*MAKEDEPEND.*;/true;/' util/domd || die
+
+	# quiet out unknown driver argument warnings since openssl
+	# doesn't have well-split CFLAGS and we're making it even worse
+	# and 'make depend' uses -Werror for added fun (#417795 again)
+	[[ ${CC} == *clang* ]] && append-flags -Qunused-arguments
+
+	# allow openssl to be cross-compiled
+	cp "${FILESDIR}"/gentoo.config-1.0.1 gentoo.config || die
+	chmod a+rx gentoo.config
+
+	append-flags -fno-strict-aliasing
+	append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
+	append-cppflags -DOPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+
+	sed -i '1s,^:$,#!'${EPREFIX}'/usr/bin/perl,' Configure #141906
+	# The config script does stupid stuff to prompt the user.  Kill it.
+	sed -i '/stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste/d' config || die
+	./config --test-sanity || die "I AM NOT SANE"
+
+	multilib_copy_sources
+}
+
+multilib_src_configure() {
+	unset APPS #197996
+	unset SCRIPTS #312551
+	unset CROSS_COMPILE #311473
+
+	tc-export CC AR RANLIB RC
+
+	# Clean out patent-or-otherwise-encumbered code
+	# Camellia: Royalty Free            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camellia_(cipher)
+	# IDEA:     Expired                 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Data_Encryption_Algorithm
+	# EC:       ????????? ??/??/2015    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography
+	# MDC2:     Expired                 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MDC-2
+	# RC5:      Expirted                http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC5
+
+	use_ssl() { usex $1 "enable-${2:-$1}" "no-${2:-$1}" " ${*:3}" ; }
+	echoit() { echo "$@" ; "$@" ; }
+
+	local krb5=$(has_version app-crypt/mit-krb5 && echo "MIT" || echo "Heimdal")
+
+	# See if our toolchain supports __uint128_t.  If so, it's 64bit
+	# friendly and can use the nicely optimized code paths. #460790
+	local ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
+	# Disable it for now though #469976
+	#if ! use bindist ; then
+	#	echo "__uint128_t i;" > "${T}"/128.c
+	#	if ${CC} ${CFLAGS} -c "${T}"/128.c -o /dev/null >&/dev/null ; then
+	#		ec_nistp_64_gcc_128="enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128"
+	#	fi
+	#fi
+
+	local sslout=$(./gentoo.config)
+	einfo "Use configuration ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
+	local config="Configure"
+	[[ -z ${sslout} ]] && config="config"
+
+	echoit \
+	./${config} \
+		${sslout} \
+		$(use sctp && echo "sctp") \
+		$(use cpu_flags_x86_sse2 || echo "no-sse2") \
+		enable-camellia \
+		$(use_ssl !bindist ec) \
+		${ec_nistp_64_gcc_128} \
+		enable-idea \
+		enable-mdc2 \
+		enable-rc5 \
+		enable-tlsext \
+		$(use_ssl gmp gmp -lgmp) \
+		$(use_ssl kerberos krb5 --with-krb5-flavor=${krb5}) \
+		$(use_ssl rfc3779) \
+		$(use_ssl tls-heartbeat heartbeats) \
+		$(use_ssl zlib) \
+		--prefix="${EPREFIX}"/usr \
+		--openssldir="${EPREFIX}"${SSL_CNF_DIR} \
+		--libdir=$(get_libdir) \
+		shared threads \
+		|| die
+
+	# Clean out hardcoded flags that openssl uses
+	local CFLAG=$(grep ^CFLAG= Makefile | LC_ALL=C sed \
+		-e 's:^CFLAG=::' \
+		-e 's:-fomit-frame-pointer ::g' \
+		-e 's:-O[0-9] ::g' \
+		-e 's:-march=[-a-z0-9]* ::g' \
+		-e 's:-mcpu=[-a-z0-9]* ::g' \
+		-e 's:-m[a-z0-9]* ::g' \
+	)
+	sed -i \
+		-e "/^CFLAG/s|=.*|=${CFLAG} ${CFLAGS}|" \
+		-e "/^SHARED_LDFLAGS=/s|$| ${LDFLAGS}|" \
+		Makefile || die
+}
+
+multilib_src_compile() {
+	# depend is needed to use $confopts; it also doesn't matter
+	# that it's -j1 as the code itself serializes subdirs
+	emake -j1 depend
+	emake all
+	# rehash is needed to prep the certs/ dir; do this
+	# separately to avoid parallel build issues.
+	emake rehash
+}
+
+multilib_src_test() {
+	emake -j1 test
+}
+
+multilib_src_install() {
+	emake INSTALL_PREFIX="${D}" install
+}
+
+multilib_src_install_all() {
+	dobin "${WORKDIR}"/c_rehash #333117
+	dodoc CHANGES* FAQ NEWS README doc/*.txt doc/c-indentation.el
+	dohtml -r doc/*
+	use rfc3779 && dodoc engines/ccgost/README.gost
+
+	# This is crappy in that the static archives are still built even
+	# when USE=static-libs.  But this is due to a failing in the openssl
+	# build system: the static archives are built as PIC all the time.
+	# Only way around this would be to manually configure+compile openssl
+	# twice; once with shared lib support enabled and once without.
+	use static-libs || rm -f "${ED}"/usr/lib*/lib*.a
+
+	# create the certs directory
+	dodir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs
+	cp -RP certs/* "${ED}"${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs/ || die
+	rm -r "${ED}"${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs/{demo,expired}
+
+	# Namespace openssl programs to prevent conflicts with other man pages
+	cd "${ED}"/usr/share/man
+	local m d s
+	for m in $(find . -type f | xargs grep -L '#include') ; do
+		d=${m%/*} ; d=${d#./} ; m=${m##*/}
+		[[ ${m} == openssl.1* ]] && continue
+		[[ -n $(find -L ${d} -type l) ]] && die "erp, broken links already!"
+		mv ${d}/{,ssl-}${m}
+		# fix up references to renamed man pages
+		sed -i '/^[.]SH "SEE ALSO"/,/^[.]/s:\([^(, ]*(1)\):ssl-\1:g' ${d}/ssl-${m}
+		ln -s ssl-${m} ${d}/openssl-${m}
+		# locate any symlinks that point to this man page ... we assume
+		# that any broken links are due to the above renaming
+		for s in $(find -L ${d} -type l) ; do
+			s=${s##*/}
+			rm -f ${d}/${s}
+			ln -s ssl-${m} ${d}/ssl-${s}
+			ln -s ssl-${s} ${d}/openssl-${s}
+		done
+	done
+	[[ -n $(find -L ${d} -type l) ]] && die "broken manpage links found :("
+
+	dodir /etc/sandbox.d #254521
+	echo 'SANDBOX_PREDICT="/dev/crypto"' > "${ED}"/etc/sandbox.d/10openssl
+
+	diropts -m0700
+	keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/private
+}
+
+pkg_preinst() {
+	has_version ${CATEGORY}/${PN}:0.9.8 && return 0
+	preserve_old_lib /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}.so.0.9.8
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	ebegin "Running 'c_rehash ${EROOT%/}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs/' to rebuild hashes #333069"
+	c_rehash "${EROOT%/}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs" >/dev/null
+	eend $?
+
+	has_version ${CATEGORY}/${PN}:0.9.8 && return 0
+	preserve_old_lib_notify /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}.so.0.9.8
+}